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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: NON-DEBTOR RECOVERY FOR 
BAD FAITH INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS 
ABSTRACT 
Involuntary bankruptcy is a powerful tool that creditors can use as a last 
resort in attempting to collect a debt. Because this option is inherently 
dangerous to undeserving debtors, the Bankruptcy Code provides for extensive 
damages if creditors pursue involuntary bankruptcy in bad faith. 
Unsurprisingly, this danger extends to non-debtor third parties tied to the 
economic wellbeing of the debtors, but a recent circuit split creates a question 
as to whether protection extends to these non-debtors as well.  
While no court found that the collaterally harmed third parties had standing 
under the damages provision of the Bankruptcy Code, in August 2016 the Third 
Circuit split from Ninth Circuit precedent by finding that non-debtor third 
parties could pursue recovery in state court. The Ninth Circuit had previously 
relied on complete preemption to foreclose these opportunities.  
This Comment argues the Third Circuit’s approach is moving in the right 
direction and ultimately proposes a hybrid approach that attempts to solve the 
flaws in both circuit decisions.  
INTRODUCTION 
An August 2016 decision by the Third Circuit created a circuit split on an 
issue of importance for creditors contemplating filing and parties harmed by an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition.1 The split concerns whether, under § 303 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), a non-debtor third party is preempted by the 
Code from pursuing a claim under state law resulting from an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith.2 The Third Circuit ultimately ruled in 
favor of the injured non-debtor third parties, ruling against preemption.3 This 
decision set the Third Circuit in conflict with the Ninth Circuit, which previously 
interpreted the Code to completely preempt state law claims and prevent non-
debtor third parties from having standing to pursue damages for an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith.4 This circuit split involves interpretive 
 
 1 Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 2 Compare Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419, with Miles v. Okun (In re Miles), 430 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 3 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419. 
 4 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083. 
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differences of statutory construction, competing jurisdictional doctrines, 
congressional intent, and the ultimate purpose of the Code within the realm of 
involuntary bankruptcy law in the United States.5 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation is more 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s presumption against preemption and 
reduces tension within the Code created by the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling. 
Additionally, this Comment suggests a third, hybrid approach to how the courts 
could interpret the Code in order to achieve the goals set forth by both Circuits. 
First, this Comment explores the history, purpose, and current trends of 
involuntary bankruptcy within the U.S. Bankruptcy system. There are three 
central building blocks inherent in any of these situations, and thus this 
Comment next provides important background information of each in turn: (1) 
the relevant Code provisions; (2) the complex and often overlapping preemption 
and removal doctrines; and (3) the situations in which a non-debtor third party 
might be damaged in an involuntary bankruptcy filing.  
This Comment then proceeds in three parts by (1) detailing the recent Third 
and Ninth Circuit cases and the resulting split between them; (2) arguing that the 
Third Circuit result is preferable; and (3) examining the potential impact of this 
ruling on the current involuntary bankruptcy trends. Finally, this Comment 
suggests a potential third option for courts to interpret the Code in these 
situations and concludes with a call to Congress to clarify its intent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Purpose of Involuntary Bankruptcy 
Involuntary bankruptcy, as its name suggests, is a tool that creditors can use 
to force unwilling debtors into a chapter 7 or chapter 11 bankruptcy.6 The 
concept has existed since bankruptcy laws were first enacted in 16th century 
England.7 In fact, involuntary bankruptcy was the only type of bankruptcy 
available in the United States until the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1841.8 
The dominant purpose of the original bankruptcy system was to help creditors 
collect debts, not to aid debtors in finding relief from creditors, and as such only 
 
 5 See Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419; In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094. 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016). 
 7 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 5, 7–8 (1995). 
 8 Id. at 11, 14 & 17. 
WEBSTER COMMENT_PROOFS 1/15/2019 10:50 AM 
2019] COLLATERAL DAMAGE 113 
creditors could commence the bankruptcy proceeding.9 Bankruptcy was thus 
premised only on “debtor misconduct” and involuntary bankruptcy continued its 
reliance on this concept all the way until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,10 
at which point bankruptcy policy began to shift from debtor misconduct to 
debtor relief. As this Comment discusses below, the broad theme of bankruptcy 
law in the United States has shifted almost completely to the other side of the 
pendulum, but the tension between the competing objectives still exists today 
and permeates through the Code and case law.11  
Thus, the purpose of involuntary bankruptcy in the current Code system is 
still to provide creditors with a tool to “compel a reorganization or liquidation 
of the debtor’s estate.”12 This tool is especially useful if the creditor suspects the 
debtor is wasting or concealing assets, or to prevent other creditors from seizing 
the debtor’s property.13 However, Congress has recognized this tool inherently 
opens the door for creditor abuse and thus included significant debtor protection 
provisions in the Code as well. 
1. Trends in Involuntary Bankruptcy 
In order to examine when a creditor might be liable for a dismissed 
involuntary bankruptcy petition, it is important to first briefly inspect when, 
why, and how often creditors pursue this path. This section highlights the trends 
in involuntary bankruptcy law in the U.S. as well as reasons why creditors might 
not be choosing this option for collecting on a debt.  
Despite the prevalence of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings in the early 
stages of bankruptcy law and Congress’ continued support of their use, in 
modern history, the number of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings filed each 
year is surprisingly low, both in total and in comparison to the number of 
voluntary bankruptcy cases filed each year, as seen in Figure 1 below.  
  
 
 9 Tabb, supra note 7, at 8. 
 10 Id.  
 11 See Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Involuntary Petitions under the New Bankruptcy Code, 
97 BANKING L.J. 292, 328 (1980). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Joseph G. Rosania, Involuntary Petitions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 13 COLO. LAW. 
1367, 1368 (1984). 
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Year Total Bankruptcies Total Involuntary % Involuntary 
1970  194,399   1,099  0.57% 
1975  254,484   1,286  0.51% 
1980  210,364   936  0.44% 
1985  364,536   1,597  0.44% 
1990  749,981   1,637  0.22% 
1995  883,457   1,142  0.13% 
2000  1,262,102   730  0.06% 
2005  1,782,643   563  0.03% 
2010  1,596,355   1,054  0.07% 
2015  860,182   351  0.04% 
 
Figure 1: Involuntary Bankruptcy Cases Filed by Year14 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in part to encourage 
involuntary bankruptcies by relaxing the standard that creditors must prove to 
successfully place a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy.15 Notwithstanding these 
efforts, involuntary bankruptcies have remained few and continued to decline.16 
The significant risks a creditor faces when filing an involuntary bankruptcy, 
 
 14 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf. 
 15 Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too 
Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804 (1991). 
 16 Id. 
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combined with the variety of alternative options for collecting on a debt, have 
left involuntary bankruptcies as a last resort, a view supported by the bankruptcy 
courts.17 
It is important to note, however, that “these statistics do not present a clear 
picture of the extent to which debtors are coerced into bankruptcy. The line 
between voluntary and involuntary filings is an ambiguous one because debtors 
often file voluntary petitions in reaction to creditors’ collection efforts.”18 
Elizabeth Warren accentuates this by stating “[a] very real issue-and one often 
ignored-is whether the barriers to involuntary filings discourage too many 
creditors who should force a defaulting creditor into the bankruptcy process.”19 
If Congress were to takes steps to combat these overly coerced voluntary 
bankruptcies, involuntary bankruptcy could see increased usage and 
significance.  
Overall, involuntary bankruptcies are likely here to stay, even as an 
infrequently used last resort.20 Despite the seemingly inconsequential number of 
involuntary bankruptcies relative to the entire bankruptcy scheme, this process 
remains an important aspect of both the Code and creditor collection options and 
thus warrants continued analysis.  
2. Requirements For Filing an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition Under 
§ 303 
Involuntary bankruptcy cases are governed by § 303 of the Code, which sets 
forth the requirements for a creditor to be able to file an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition.21 As previously mentioned, creditors may initiate involuntary 
bankruptcy proceedings under either chapter 7 or chapter 11. 22 However, there 
 
 17 See Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Capital Fin., Inc., 
No. BAP CC-07-1122-BAKPA, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4913, at *1 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2007); In re Meltzer, 
516 B.R. 504, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 18 Block-Lieb, supra note 15. 
 19 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 798 (1987). 
 20 Block-Lieb, supra note 15. 
 21 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016). 
 22 In chapter 11 bankruptcy, debts are not liquidated but restructured such that debt repayment is possible. 
The debtor maintains possession of its assets in chapter 11. In chapter 7 bankruptcy assets are sold and liquidated 
to repay as much of the debt as possible. Much of the remaining debt is discharged (forgiven). Chapter 11 
bankruptcy is more common in situations involving corporations and other businesses, and chapter 7 bankruptcy 
is more commonly used by individuals; “Involuntary chapter 13 cases are not permitted…To do so would 
constitute bad policy, because chapter 13 only works when there is a willing debtor that wants to repay his 
creditors. Short of involuntary servitude, it is difficult to keep a debtor working for his creditors when he does 
not want to pay them back.” S. REP. 95-989, at 32 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818; 2 
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 22:1 (3rd ed. 2018); 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
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are more than five times as many chapter 7 involuntary bankruptcy petitions as 
chapter 11.23 This reflects the fact that involuntary bankruptcy proceedings do 
not usually occur until it is too late for an optimistic outlook towards 
restructuring and reorganization of the debtor—the goals of chapter 11—and the 
creditor is hoping to recover whatever it can through the liquidation that results 
from a chapter 11 case.24 This highlights the recurring theme in involuntary 
bankruptcy that creditors must balance the risks of forcing debtors into 
bankruptcy and the potential serious penalties, if incorrect, against their goal of 
recovering at least some of the debt. 
Under either chapter there are several requirements that must be met for a 
debtor to be eligible for an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.25 First, the 
aggregate amount of eligible unsecured claims held by the debtors must be at 
least $15,775.26 If the debtor has twelve or more creditors, then at least three of 
the creditors must participate in the filing.27 If there are fewer than twelve 
creditors, only one creditor must file for the petition to qualify.28 Finally, a claim 
is only considered eligible for involuntary bankruptcy if there is no legitimate 
reason that the debtor has not paid the debt, and thus the court disqualifies claims 
that are (1) contingent as to a liability, or (2) subject to a dispute.29 
Once the creditor(s) petition the bankruptcy court, the debtor can only 
defend against being forced into bankruptcy by filing an answer to the petition.30 
Once the creditor petition meets the various administrative requirements, 
including on time filing and satisfying the above thresholds for the dollar amount 
of claims and number of creditors, the court will review the case.31 The court 
will rule against the debtor and thus put them into involuntary bankruptcy only 
if (1) the debtor is “generally not paying such debtors’ debts as such debts 
become due;”32 or (2) a custodian has been appointed or taken possession of all 
 
 23 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf. 
 24 Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 850. 
 25 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
 26 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2). 
 28 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). 
 29 Id. 
 30 11 U.S.C. § 303(d). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See 2 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC, supra note 22 (“To establish that a debtor is not paying its debts as 
they become due, a petitioning creditor must do more than establish that the debtor has unpaid creditors or 
creditors whose obligations carry no fixed dates; petitioners must, in fact, outline the regular payment terms for 
the debts and then show that the debts are overdue according to those terms.4 Furthermore, it must be shown 
that the debtor’s delinquency is germane. Courts have used four factors in making this determination: (1) the 
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or substantially all of the debtor’s assets within 120 days before the filing date 
of creditor petition.33  
3. Damages Awarded for Dismissed Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition 
Under § 303(i) 
Courts carefully scrutinize involuntary bankruptcy decisions because “the 
filing of an involuntary petition is an extreme remedy with serious consequences 
to the alleged debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer assets 
and carry on business affairs, and public embarrassment,” regardless of whether 
the petitions ends up heard or dismissed.34 The courts are also wary of becoming 
overburdened if seen as a common tool for collecting any debts:  
An allegation of bankruptcy is a charge that ought not to be made 
lightly. It usually chills the alleged debtor’s credit and his sources of 
supply. It can scare away his customers. It leaves a permanent scar, 
even if promptly dismissed. It is also obvious that the use of the 
bankruptcy court as a routine collection device would quickly paralyze 
this court.35  
Because the courts view involuntary petitions as a last resort remedy for 
creditors that has severe ramifications for the debtor, the Code sets forth serious 
consequences for creditors who file an involuntary bankruptcy petition that ends 
up being dismissed.36 Section 303(i) establishes that: 
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on 
consent of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive 
the right to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant 
judgment— 
(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for— 
(A) costs; or 
(B) a reasonable attorney’s fee; or 
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for— 
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or 
(B) punitive damages.37 
 
number of unpaid claims; (2) the amount of such claims; (3) the materiality of the nonpayment; and (4) the 
debtor’s overall conduct of its financial affairs.”). 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 303(d). 
 34 In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 35 In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). 
 36 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). 
 37 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). 
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By holding creditors accountable for costs, attorney’s fees, and even 
compensatory and punitive damages if the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding is 
dismissed in bad faith, Congress has firmly expressed its view that involuntary 
bankruptcies should not be taken lightly when a creditor evaluates its options for 
collecting a debt.38 This is a primary reason why involuntary bankruptcies are 
becoming increasingly rare,39 and it is a reflection of how far the U.S. 
bankruptcy system has shifted from helping creditors collect to protecting 
debtors from collection. 
As discussed in more detail below, § 303(i)(1) of the Code expressly 
reserves awards for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for only the debtor.40 
The circuit split and this Comment focus on the rights of non-debtors whose 
potential claim would only arise under § 303(i)(2). Section 303(i)(2) provides 
for compensatory and punitive damages if the involuntary bankruptcy petition 
is filed in bad faith.41 Thus, it is important to examine how a court determines 
what constitutes “bad faith” with respect to involuntary bankruptcy petitions.  
First, “there is a presumption of good faith in favor of the petitioning 
creditor, and thus the alleged debtor has the burden of proving bad faith.”42 
Additionally, “this burden is a significant one” as the debtor “must prove bad 
faith by at least a preponderance of the evidence.”43 This high burden makes 
sense considering the harsh penalties the creditor faces if this burden is met. 
Because “the determination of bad faith is a fact intensive determination” and 
the standard for defining bad faith is not defined in the Code, “courts have 
applied a dizzying array of standards.”44  
Recently, the Third Circuit illustrated this dizzying array of standards, 
calling it a “totality of the circumstances” standard of review.45 It stated that 
courts may consider a number of factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether: (1) the creditors satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the 
petition; (2) the involuntary petition was meritorious; (3) the creditors 
made a reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law 
before filing; (4) there was evidence of preferential payments to certain 
 
 38 In re Reid, 773 F.2d at 946. 
 39 Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 
WIS. L. REV. 311, 353 (1982). 
 40 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1). 
 41 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2). 
 42 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008, 1011 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 43 In re CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). 
 44 In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 45 Id. 
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creditors or of dissipation of the debtor’s assets; (5) the filing was 
motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; (6) the petitioning creditors 
used the filing to obtain a disproportionate advantage for themselves 
rather than to protect against other creditors doing the same; (7) the 
filing was used as a tactical advantage in pending actions; (8) the filing 
was used as a substitute for customary debt-collection procedures; and 
(9) the filing had suspicious timing.46 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the court will employ a case-by-case analysis to 
determine whether a petitioning creditor acted in bad faith,47 and if it finds that 
such creditors acted in bad faith, the compensatory and punitive damages 
awarded are often severe.48 For example, in In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, 
Inc., the Third Circuit used a combination of the third, seventh, eighth, and ninth 
factors to determine that the creditor filed the petition in bad faith.49 In Forever 
Green, the creditor had a pending judgment against the debtor which it could 
have used to satisfy payments owed to the creditor. However, the creditor in 
Forever Green filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that was “light on 
meritorious arguments,” had suspicious timing, and was clearly being used as a 
tactical advantage in pending actions to get an advantage over other creditors 
and “to gain a personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-collection 
service.”50 The court concluded that this did in fact constitute a bad faith 
involuntary bankruptcy petition.51 
B. Preemption and Removal Jurisdiction Doctrine 
In addition to the specific Code sections governing involuntary bankruptcies, 
preemption and removal play an important role within bankruptcy law in general 
and in the involuntary bankruptcy context. While the Code is federal law, 
bankruptcy almost always involves issues of contract law, over which state law 
 
 46 In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 336. 
 47 See Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 842 (“There is no single definition of bad faith for purposes of section 
303(i). Some courts emphasize petitioners’ desires to harass, embarrass or harm the debtor as indicative of bad 
faith.” Others have found bad faith in the petitioning creditors’ [attempts] to use bankruptcy as a substitute for 
their state collection remedies. Collusive behavior has also often been held to constitute bad faith. That one or 
more creditors solicited others to join in the involuntary petition is not alone indicative of collusion or bad faith. 
Although one court was persuaded that a petitioning creditor did not act in bad faith when it relied on erroneous 
legal advice, several others have found that the petitioners’ reliance on legal advice is not dispositive of their 
good faith.”). 
 48 In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 439 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the bankruptcy 
court did not err in awarding costs, attorney’s fees, compensatory damages, and punitive damages totaling $6.4 
million pursuant to § 303(i) based on bad-faith filing of involuntary petition.). 
 49 In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 336. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 338. 
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typically governs.52 Thus, it is unsurprising that these often overlap, compete, 
and sometimes clash and consequently invoke the very essence of preemption. 
In addition to the substantive issues involved in the case, the forum in which 
these issues are litigated and decided also often intersect.53 This leads to 
additional issues related to removal of bankruptcy related proceedings from state 
to federal courts.  
These federalism issues—preemption and removal—are central to the theme 
of this Comment and the fulcrum of the circuit split, and as such the Comment 
next provides an overview of federal preemption and removal jurisdiction.  
1. Federal Preemption 
Established by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,54 the Supreme 
Court has “long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are 
without effect.”55 Preemption embodies the Founders’ separation of powers 
concerns in drafting the Constitution as a doctrine that is a “necessary but 
precarious component of our system of federalism under which the states and 
the federal government possess concurrent sovereignty.”56 The Supreme Court 
requires that any preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones of 
our preemption jurisprudence.”57 These two cornerstones are (1) “the purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case;” and (2) “in all 
preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated … 
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.” 58 In other words, in every preemption case the courts are 
required to (1) look first and foremost to Congress’ intent to supersede the state 
law; and (2) unless such congressional intent is “clear and manifest,” examine 
the case with a “presumption against preemption.”59 With this framework in 
mind, the court has demonstrated that there are two overarching types of federal 
preemption: complete and ordinary.60 While both deal with situations in which 
federal law supersedes state law, there are multiple differences between them.  
 
 52 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 49 (1979). 
 53 See Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 54 U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 55 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 
 56 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 57 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 58 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 59 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565. 
 60 Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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2. Ordinary Preemption 
Much more common than complete preemption, ordinary preemption is 
known as “defensive preemption” because it is a tool that defendants can use to 
prove in a state law action that “because federal law preempts state law, the 
defendant cannot be held liable under state law.”61 Ordinary preemption doctrine 
provides that after a plaintiff files suit in state court under a state law cause of 
action, one of the defendant’s defenses may be that the state law at issue in the 
case is preempted by federal law, and thus the plaintiff’s complaint cannot be 
successful.62 As will become evident in the next section, it is important to note 
that this defensive preemption serves only as a defense in the state court trial, 
not as justification for federal subject matter jurisdiction and thus a removal of 
the case to federal courts.63 
The Supreme Court has found that “ordinary defensive preemption comes in 
three familiar forms: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field 
preemption.”64  
(1) Congress’ intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s language 
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. In the absence of 
an express congressional command, (2) state law is pre-empted if that 
law actually conflicts with federal law, or (3) if federal law so 
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.65  
Field preemption is at the heart of the circuit split discussed below. Field 
preemption occurs when “an Act of Congress touches a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”66 As discussed above, field 
preemption, as with all the other preemption doctrines, requires that 
“congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest.”67  
 
 61 Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272–73. 
 62 See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable 
Commc’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11th Cir. 1999); Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 63 See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393. 
 64 Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 273. 
 65 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 
1, 14 (1983) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal 
defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and 
even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”). 
 66 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 67 Id. 
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3. Complete Preemption 
The other type of preemption is complete preemption. Despite its name, 
complete preemption is “less a principle of substantive preemption than it is a 
rule of federal jurisdiction,”68 and at its core is an exception to the well pleaded 
complaint rule for removal to federal court.69 The well pleaded complaint rule is 
a procedural rule stating that federal jurisdiction does not apply to a case unless 
the plaintiff’s complaint asserts on its face an issue of federal law. 
Consequentially, the only way a federal question is litigated in federal court is if 
the plaintiff brings up the federal issue. Thus, within the preemption context, 
unless the plaintiff’s claim mentions federal law, a defendant cannot remove the 
case based on a defense of ordinary federal preemption. This has been made 
particularly clear by the Supreme Court, stating that “a case may not be removed 
to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of 
preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and 
even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at 
issue.”70  
Complete preemption exists as an exception to this rule. While it remains a 
rare, “troublesome and confusing” doctrine,71 “[u]nder the complete-preemption 
doctrine, certain federal statutes are construed to have such ‘extraordinary’ 
preemptive force that state-law claims coming within the scope of the federal 
statute are transformed, for jurisdictional purposes, into federal claims.”72 
Because “preemption and jurisdiction are . . . inexorably intertwined,”73 this 
doctrine allows for cases to be removed to federal courts even if the plaintiff did 
not assert the federal issue in their complaint and the claims are decided under 
federal law. Complete preemption alone grants both removal and preemption all 
at once. The Supreme Court has only extended complete preemption to three 
statutes: (1) § 301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 185;74 (2) § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
 
 68 Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc, 182 F.3d at 855. 
 69 Id.; In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094. 
 70 Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393. 
 71 Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 21 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Miles, 430 F.3d 
at 1094.  
 72 Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272. 
 73 MSR Expl., Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 74 See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
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1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132;75 and (3) § 85 and § 86 of the National Bank 
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86.76 
4. Comparing and Distinguishing Field And Complete Preemption 
The line between field and complete preemption is both narrow and 
complicated and continues to evolve. While they do “serve distinct purposes”77 
and “must be distinguished,”78 they are also so similar their analyses have even 
led to “some courts’ confusion of field preemption with the complete preemption 
doctrine,79 “occasionally . . . equat[ing] complete preemption to field 
preemption,”80 or describing complete preemption as a “subspecies of field 
preemption.”81 The confusion permeates throughout multiple circuit courts.82 
As previously mentioned, their primary difference is that complete 
preemption is at its core a jurisdictional doctrine used to remove a case to federal 
court while field preemption is used to decide a case, usually by state court 
justices applying the preemptive federal law. Complete preemption “applies 
only where Congress creates an exclusive federal cause of action,”83 while the 
field preemption tests whether “Congress intended to foreclose any state 
regulation.”84 This means that in complete preemption, Congress enacts 
legislation that not only completely supersedes, or preempts, any state law on 
the subject, but also can only be litigated in federal courts. Field preemption only 
accomplishes the former objective of preempting any state law on the issue. 
 
 75 See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). 
 76 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1. For a detailed explanation of these three cases and how the 
relate to bankruptcy; see also Oleksandra Johnson, The Bankruptcy Code as Complete Preemption: The Ultimate 
Trump?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 31, 64 (2007). 
 77 Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 78 Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272. 
 79 S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 747 
(1991). 
 80 Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 948. 
 81 Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1097 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 82 See e.g., Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272; Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 
1107 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 n. 4 (1st Cir. 2007); In re NOS Commc’ns, 
495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003); ARCO Envtl. 
Remediation, 213 F.3d at 1114; Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., 701 F.3d 243, 254 (8th Cir. 2012) (Beam, J., 
dissenting); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 417 (7th Cir. 2002); Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919 
(7th Cir. 2000). 
 83 Carter v. Cent. Reg’l W. Va. Airport Auth., Triad Eng’g, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-13155, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96523, at *38 (S.D. W. Va. July 25, 2016). 
 84 Id. at *44. 
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Likely unsurprising at this point, however, both doctrines “bear a number of 
similarities” and “rest on the breadth . . . of a federal statute’s preemptive 
force.”85 As such, and most important for the analysis in this Comment, the line 
between them is sufficiently narrow that the analysis of one would very likely 
lead to the same result as the analysis of the other.86 If the relevant evidence does 
not demonstrate clear and manifest congressional intent to “regulate the entire 
field,”87 neither field nor complete preemption is likely to apply. Figure 2 
provides a diagram demonstrating how field and complete preemption fit into 
the larger preemption doctrine.  
Figure 2: Federal Preemption Doctrine 
 
 85 Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 948. 
 86 See generally Rosenberg, 835 F.3d 414. 
 87 ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C., 213 F.3d 1108. 
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5. Removal Jurisdiction 
Because complete preemption is at its core a jurisdictional doctrine used as 
a basis for removal, it is also important to provide a brief background of removal 
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context. Bankruptcy courts have existed in their 
present form, a separate federal court in each federal district, since the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.88 The scope of their jurisdictional power has 
undergone both expansion and narrowing through the actions of both Congress 
and Supreme Court.89 Section 1334 of title 28 governs federal courts’ 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases: 
[C]urrently district courts ‘have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11,’ and ‘original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.’90 
The federal district court may then refer the case to bankruptcy courts. The 
complex analysis to determine what makes a case “under” versus “arising under” 
or “arising in related to cases under” title 11 is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, as is the type of proceedings bankruptcy courts can receive from 
federal courts.91 However, once a case is in state court, removal of claims related 
to bankruptcy cases is governed by both § 1441 (the “general federal removal 
statute”) and § 1452 (the “bankruptcy removal statute”) of title 28 of the United 
States Code.92 Section 1452 provides: 
§ 1452. Removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases 
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action 
other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil 
action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s 
police or regulatory power, to the district court for the district where 
such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of 
such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.93  
 Thus, a claim within the “original and exclusive jurisdiction … under 
title 11” as set forth in section 1334 may be removed by any party pursuant 
 
 88 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by Pub. L. No. 109-08, 
119 Stat. 23 (effective as to cases filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005, with certain specified exceptions) (codified at 
11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1532)(2016). 
 89 For a summary of this evolution, see Johnson, supra note 76. 
 90 Johnson, supra note 76, at 46. 
 91 Johnson, supra note 76. 
 92 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 126 (1995). 
 93 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (2016). 
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to section 1452.94 This works similarly to the jurisdiction aspect of complete 
preemption: even if the plaintiff only brings a state law claim, if the court 
finds the case to meet the statutory bankruptcy jurisdictional requirements the 
defendant can remove the case based on federal question jurisdiction.95 
To summarize, preemption doctrine determines whether federal or state law 
applies to an issue in a case and removal doctrine dictates whether the issue is 
litigated in federal or state court. Complete preemption at once answers both 
questions—law and forum—with the federal system. 
C. Non-Debtor Third Party in Involuntary Bankruptcy 
Finally, in addition to the relevant Code provisions, preemption and 
jurisdictional doctrines, the issue in these cases and this Comment rests on the 
rights of non-debtor third parties. While nothing in the Code or its legislative 
history discusses non-debtors or their potential remedies within the involuntary 
bankruptcy arena, it is quite intuitive that non-debtors could be proximately or 
derivatively damaged from a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition. For the 
debtor, involuntary bankruptcy “chills the alleged debtor’s credit and his sources 
of supply. It can scare away his customers. It leaves a permanent scar, even if 
promptly dismissed.”96 Despite potentially abandoning the debtor, these 
hypothetical creditors, suppliers, and customers of the debtor are not immune 
from collateral damage caused by the involuntary bankruptcy petition. Courts 
have recognized that “it is important here to note that the harm from an improper 
involuntary bankruptcy petition can result not only to the debtor but also to the 
debtor’s owners, employees, suppliers, customers and other creditors.”97 This is 
especially true with the vast majority of involuntary bankruptcies initiated under 
chapter 7, where third parties would be forced to prepare for the complete 
liquidation of the debtor.98 
For example, consider how an involuntary bankruptcy petition, filed against 
a manufacturer, could affect one of the manufacturer’s suppliers. The supplier’s 
revenue, cash flow, and credit might be tied to the expectation of sales to the 
manufacturer. It is no stretch to imagine that the supplier’s finances, whether 
through its stock price or creditworthiness, will likely deteriorate under fear of 
the lost revenue. This logic applies to large corporations within a global, 
 
 94 Johnson, supra note 76, at 46. 
 95 Johnson, supra note 76. 
 96 In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. at 101. 
 97 In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. at 605. 
 98 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf.  
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complex supply chain to small business owners to individual consumers. In an 
increasingly technological and connected society, news of such a petition will 
travel faster than ever before with potentially far reaching ramifications.  
These proximate or derivative damages also might apply to other creditors 
of the debtor.99 Interest on credit can be a significant portion of creditor revenue, 
and much like the example above, the threat of potential liquidation might also 
impact other creditors’ well-being. Overall, it is easy to imagine involuntary 
bankruptcy proceedings as having an increasingly negative impact on non-
debtors in the current environment. 
II. EXAMINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
With the Code, preemption and removal doctrines, and non-debtors’ roles in 
mind, this section will proceed in three parts. First, this section examines the 
cases and their subsequent circuit split between the Ninth and Third Circuits. 
This section next argues that the Third Circuit’s analysis is preferable. Finally, 
this section examines the potential impact of the Rosenberg decision and the 
resulting split. 
A. Analytical Structure 
Each of the case analyses follows the same structure used by the courts: (1) 
preemption and (2) standing. The courts employ this construction because in 
these situations there are two distinct ways in which the non-debtors could 
recover damages for the dismissed involuntary bankruptcy proceeding: (1) under 
state law causes of action; or (2) under § 303 of the Code. First, and why 
preemption doctrine is essential to this issue, in order to recover under state law 
the court must find that the federal Code does not preempt such state action. If 
state law is preempted by the Code, the only remaining avenue for recovery 
requires the court to determine that § 303(i)(2) gives standing to non-debtors. 
1. In re Miles 
In the Ninth Circuit case In re Miles, the defendants filed ten involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions against Rodney Miles, Ann Miles, and the businesses the 
Miles affiliated with or owned, all resulting from a neighborly feud.100 After the 
bankruptcy court dismissed all of the petitions, nine of them on grounds 
including bad faith, Ann Miles and the couple’s daughters “filed three 
 
 99 In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. at 605. 
 100 In re Miles, 294 B.R. at 758, aff’d, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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substantially identical tort actions in a California state court seeking damages 
for the filing and prosecution of the involuntary petitions.”101 The complaints 
stated theories of defamation, false light, abuse of process, emotional distress, 
negligent misrepresentation, and simple negligence.102 The bankruptcy court, 
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and Ninth Circuit all ruled that (1) 
the state law tort claims were completely preempted by § 303(i) of the Code; 
and (2) the Miles’ did not have standing to pursue damages for bad faith 
involuntary bankruptcy petitions under § 303(i)(2).103 This Comment next 
explores both of these holdings in turn. 
a. Preemption 
By finding for complete preemption, the court in In re Miles achieved the 
two goals inherent in the complete preemption doctrine: (1) jurisdictionally, the 
case was properly removed from state court to federal bankruptcy court; and (2) 
the Code preempts any state law action related to non-debtor third party damages 
in the bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition context.104 As discussed above, 
the complete preemption doctrine serves as a powerful exception to the well-
pleaded-complaint rule and allows for both appropriate removal and 
“transform[s] the plaintiff’s state-law claims into federal claims.”105  
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that complete preemption remains rare and 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has only applied complete preemption to specific 
provisions of three federal statutes, none of which include the Code.106 
Nevertheless, after concluding that the Code and its legislative history are silent 
on the matter, the court looks to the “structure and purpose” of the Code to 
determine if Congress intended § 303(i) “to provide the exclusive cause of action 
for damages resulting from the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”107 
The court employed a four step analysis set forth in a prior Ninth Circuit case to 
conclude that complete preemption applies in this case: (1) “Congress’ 
placement of bankruptcy jurisdiction exclusively in the federal district court”; 
(2) the complex and comprehensive nature of the Code; (3) the Constitutional 
“power to Congress ‘to establish…uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
 
 101 In re Miles, 294 B.R. at 758. 
 102 Id. at 759. 
 103 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998). 
 106 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1085. 
 107 Id. 
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throughout the United States’”; and (4) extensive remedies for improper conduct 
already provided for by the Code.108  
The court applies this logic and thus rules that by “[p]ermitting state courts 
to decide whether the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition was 
appropriate would . . . undermine uniformity in bankruptcy law by allowing state 
courts to create their own standards as to when a creditor may properly file an 
involuntary petition.”109 Finally, while the court states that it does “not hold that 
all state actions related to bankruptcy proceedings are subject to the complete 
preemption doctrine,” it reaches its decision on the premise that the Code is “far 
from silent” with respect to remedies and sanctions for behavior in the 
bankruptcy court.110 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that “§ 303(i) provides 
the exclusive cause of action for damages predicated upon the filing of an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition” and complete preemption must apply.111 
b. Standing 
Once the court ruled that the Miles’ state law claims were completely 
preempted by § 303(i) of the Code, the complaints were “recharacterized as 
alleging damages claims under § 303(i)” because “[c]omplete preemption 
recharacterizes a complaint with state law claims into one arising under federal 
law.”112 Thus, the court had to then examine whether the Miles’ had standing to 
pursue damages under § 303(i)(2).113 
The Ninth Circuit first examined the text of the Code.114 The Code permits 
the court to grant judgment “against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor” 
under § 303(i)(1)115 and “against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad 
faith”116 under § 303(i)(2).117 The court found that there are two possible 
readings for “mentioning only the debtor and the petitioning creditors in 
§ 303(i)(1)” but omitting the words “and in favor of the debtor” in § 303(i)(2): 
(1) Congress intended to limit the debtor’s standing; or (2) Congress intended to 
allow standing for non-debtors if the involuntary petition was filed in bad 
 
 108 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1085. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1088. 
 111 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 112 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 
958 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotes omitted). 
 113 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 114 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 115 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 116 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 117 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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faith.118 In finding multiple potential interpretations, the court stated that the 
language is ambiguous and thus the court must consider “legislative history, 
relevant case law, and public policy to resolve the question.”119  
Thus, the court extracted the relevant 1977 House and Senate Reports, 
adding emphasis to “debtor” to interpret congressional intent limiting damages 
from bad faith involuntary bankruptcy filings: 
[I]f a petitioning creditor filed the petition in bad faith, the court may 
award the debtor any damages proximately caused by the filing of the 
petition. These damages may include such items as loss of business 
during and after the pendency of the case, and so on.120  
 The court finished its ruling by returning to a textual analysis in examining 
the introductory clause to § 303(i) that grants “the debtor” the ability to “waive 
the right to judgment under this subsection:”121  
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent 
of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right 
to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment— 
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for— 
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or 
(B) punitive damages.122  
The court read this provision such that “allowing third parties to seek damages 
could invite abuse of the system” because debtors could extort petitioning 
creditors or non-debtors seeking damages into paying for waiver or non-waiver 
by the debtor.123 Therefore, because Congress “took great care” in drafting the 
Code such that it would prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process, Congress could 
not have intended this provision to apply to non-debtor third parties.124  
c. Judge Berzon’s Concurrence 
In his concurrence, Judge Berzon relied on other Ninth Circuit precedent to 
argue for a simpler approach: any action that collaterally attacks a bankruptcy 
petition are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal courts, and 
 
 118 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094. 
 119 Id. 
 120 H.R.Rep. No. 95–595, at 324 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280 (emphasis added); 
S.Rep. No. 95–989, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820 (identical text). 
 121 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016). 
 122 Id. (emphasis added). 
 123 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 124 Id. 
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thus the state court in such a situation has no power to hear the case.125 Judge 
Berzon agreed that “state law claims in the present case are preempted because 
state law cannot add to the remedial scheme Congress created under the 
Bankruptcy Code” but also found that the majority holding “would to a degree 
swallow the well-pleaded complaint rule, by permitting removal to federal court 
in any circumstance in which federal law provides someone a cause of action 
and also precludes state law causes of action.”126 He summarized his argument: 
In short, there is removal jurisdiction under the exclusive jurisdiction 
rationale . . . I see no reason to expand the troublesome and confusing 
doctrine of complete preemption . . . as there is another, simpler ground 
for reaching the same result. I therefore would not reach the question 
of whether there is complete preemption in this case.127  
Judge Berzon essentially disagreed with the jurisdictional reasoning “in the 
choice-of-law sense” for removal to the federal courts.128 Judge Berzon’s 
argument reached the same result with a different line of reasoning: (1) the filing 
of involuntary bankruptcy petitions is clearly a “case under title 11” and subject 
to exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal court and sufficient to deem the 
removal proper;129 (2) the state law action is preempted by ordinary field 
preemption, not complete;130 and finally, (3) agreeing that the non-debtors do 
not have standing under the preemptive Bankruptcy Code.131 It is important here 
to note that the Miles court could have reached their exact same conclusion 
without invoking the troublesome and confusing complete preemption 
doctrine.132  
2. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC 
In Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, the Third Circuit split from the 
Ninth Circuit’s complete preemption ruling in Miles with respect to non-debtor 
 
 125 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“Gonzales v. Parks held that all actions, 
such as the present one, that collaterally attack bankruptcy petitions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). See 830 F.2d at 1035 n.6 (stating that ‘[f]ilings of bankruptcy petitions 
are a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction and that ‘[s]tate courts are not authorized to determine whether a 
person’s claim for relief under a federal law, in a federal court, and within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is 
an appropriate one’ because ‘[s]uch an exercise of authority would be inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal courts’”)). 
 126 In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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third parties pursuing state law damages for bad faith filings.133 A “fragment of 
more than a decade of ongoing litigation”, the appeal in Rosenberg involved a 
similar fact pattern to Miles.134 To finance the purchase of medical imaging 
equipment, Maury Rosenberg (the plaintiff’s husband) entered into leases with 
DVI. During litigation in state court over money Rosenberg owed under the 
leases, DVI Receivables filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against 
Rosenberg.135 After multiple suits and appeals, Rosenberg eventually won an 
action under § 303(i) against DVI Receivables in which he was awarded $1.1 
million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages under 
§ 303(i)(2) for the bad faith filing by DVI receivables.136 Non-debtor third 
parties aside, these high amounts awarded to the debtor demonstrate just how 
seriously the bankruptcy system punishes bad faith involuntary bankruptcy 
petitioners. 
Subsequently, Rosenberg’s wife Sara, along with several Rosenberg 
businesses entities, “brought suit to recover damages stemming from the 
involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed against Maury Rosenberg” under a 
“single claim of tortious interference with contracts and relationships.”137 The 
complaint alleged that DVI Receivables filed the involuntary bankruptcy 
petitions to force Rosenberg’s real estate company to default on underlying 
mortgages, which ultimately happened.138 The district court ruled to dismiss, 
finding that the “state law tortious interference claim was preempted by the 
involuntary bankruptcy provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”139 On appeal, and 
similar to the Ninth Circuit in Miles, the Third Circuit considered both standing 
and preemption. The Third Circuit “agree[d] with the Miles Court that non-
debtors lack standing under § 303(i) to recover damages.”140 The court did not 
provide any additional analysis on this point. However, the Third Circuit 
rejected Miles by holding that “Bankruptcy Code § 303(i) does not preempt state 
law claims by non-debtors for damages based on the filing of an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition.”141 
 
 133 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419. 
 134 Id. at 416. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 417. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 418. 
 140 Id. at 421. 
 141 Id. at 416. 
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a. Preemption 
The Rosenberg court performed its preemption analysis through the lens of 
field preemption instead of complete preemption. However, it points out that 
while “complete preemption is not the same as field preemption . . . finding 
complete preemption in the context § 303(i) would also support finding field 
preemption in our case.”142 Because field preemption and complete preemption 
are so similar with respect to substantive preemption issues, and, if anything, 
complete preemption requires more on the preemption spectrum; the court 
ultimately found that if field preemption did not apply, the lack of such 
preemptive force meant that neither would a finding of complete preemption.143 
Thus, the preemption analyses between the cases are comparable and thus a 
significant split exists.  
The Third Circuit in Rosenberg began its preemption analysis very 
differently from the Ninth in Miles. The Third Circuit first explained and 
emphasized the overarching Supreme Court doctrine of the presumption against 
preemption both generally and in bankruptcy cases:  
In deciding whether Congress has occupied a field for exclusive 
federal regulation, we begin, based on concerns of federalism, with a 
sturdy ‘presumption against preemption.’ ‘This strong presumption 
against inferring Congressional preemption also applies in the 
bankruptcy context.’ It is overcome when ‘a Congressional purpose to 
preempt … is clear and manifest.’144  
With this foundation, the Third Circuit analyzed each of the text, structure, 
and purpose of the Code.145 Similar to the analysis in Miles, the Rosenberg court 
acknowledged that the Code is “silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors 
harmed by an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”146 How the court interpreted this 
silence is what differed from Miles:  
This suggests that when Congress passed the provision it either did not 
intend to disturb the existing framework of state law remedies for non-
debtors or (more likely) was not thinking about non-debtor remedies 
at all. In either case, field preemption does not apply.147 
 
 142 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421 n.4. 
 143 Id. at 419. 
 144 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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Here, the Third Circuit again quoted the Supreme Court, rationally refusing to 
interpret congressional silence as a clear and manifest intention to “remove all 
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”148 
The court also found no field preemption with respect to structure and 
purpose.149 The court looked to the “remedial purpose” of § 303(i), which it 
believed to be essentially a balance of the inherent risks involved by “giving 
creditors the ability to bring a debtor into bankruptcy.”150 The Third Circuit 
found preempting state law remedies for non-debtors cuts directly against this 
remedial purpose, especially in light of the almost guarantee of proximate or 
derivative damage to third parties in these situations.151  
The opinion pivoted its analysis to disposing of various counterarguments. 
It specifically identified the public policy based uniformity concerns from Miles 
in which the Ninth Circuit believed state laws would interfere with the federal 
scheme.152 The Rosenberg court acknowledged that there likely will be conflicts 
between federal regulation and state law, but they were willing to “‘rely on the 
traditional comity between the two systems . . . .’ and trust that state courts 
faithfully will account for federal bankruptcy law to the extent it may be relevant 
to a state law claim against a creditor.”153 The Miles court acknowledged that 
state courts can account for federal bankruptcy law in other areas, but does not 
extend this trust to involuntary bankruptcy remedies like the Rosenberg court 
does here. 
The court concluded its analysis by specifically confronting the Miles 
decision but does “not find Miles persuasive on the preemption issue” because:  
Near the beginning of its analysis, the Miles Court admitted that the 
‘Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history are silent on whether 
Congress intended 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) to provide the exclusive basis 
for awarding damages predicated upon the filing of an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition.’ If we apply faithfully the presumption against 
preemption, silence on the part of Congress should be the end of the 
analysis. But the Court went on to ‘infer from Congress’s clear intent 
to provide damage awards only to the debtor ... that Congress did not 
intend [non-debtors] to be able to circumvent this rule by pursuing 
those very claims in state court.’ Absent evidence that Congress 
 
 148 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.  
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 420. 
 153 Id. 
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actually meant for § 303(i) to be an exclusive remedy, we do not make 
the same inference.154  
Finally, the Third Circuit further distanced itself from the Miles decision by 
reiterating that the Supreme Court “has never recognized complete preemption 
in the Bankruptcy Code, and it seems the Ninth Circuit stands alone in this 
regard.”155 Thus, the Third Circuit expressly held “that Bankruptcy Code 
§ 303(i) does not preempt state law claims by non-debtors for damages based on 
the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”156 
B. The Recent Third Circuit Decision is Preferable to the Ninth Circuit 
Precedent 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Rosenberg takes a significant step towards 
correcting the problem of non-debtor third parties lacking an avenue toward 
recovery in these cases. The Rosenberg decision acknowledges that Congress 
would likely not intend to foreclose any opportunity for non-debtors to pursue 
damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions.157 By ignoring the 
presumption against preemption and relying almost entirely on uniformity 
policy principles, the Ninth Circuit in Miles failed to consider the practical 
consequences of involuntary bankruptcy petitions considered in Rosenberg.  
This section argues that the Third Circuit decision is preferable to the Ninth 
Circuit precedent for four reasons: (1) it is more consistent with the purpose of 
§ 303(i); (2) it is more consistent with the modern trends in bankruptcy law; (3) 
it correctly applies the presumption against preemption doctrine; and (4) it 
encourages Congress to clearly manifest its intent. 
1. More Consistent with Purpose of § 303(i) 
As shown, an involuntary bankruptcy petition provides creditors with a path 
to inflict potentially serious damage to debtors, and the damages provision in 
§ 303(i) reflects how seriously Congress considered this tool and these risks. It 
is counterintuitive to hold that Congress would recognize and plan for such 
inherent risks in involuntary bankruptcy and provide comprehensive debtor 
protection while simultaneously foreclosing any and all remedies for non-
debtors. Additionally, the potential damages that non-debtor third parties could 
 
 154 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421–22. 
 155 Id. at 421. 
 156 Id. at 422. 
 157 Id. at 418. 
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suffer from a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy proceeding are likely to be 
significantly higher now than in 1977 when Congress last spoke on the matter, 
which the Miles court relied on in support of preemption.158 The level of 
interconnectivity and rapid information sharing in 2018 is exponentially greater 
than in 1977,159 and as such third parties to both individuals and business are 
more exposed than ever to the type of bad faith petition involved in these 
situations.  
If both the Third and Ninth Circuits are correct that non-debtors do not have 
standing under § 303(i), it would be inequitable to foreclose all opportunities to 
recover by these non-debtors and against what Congress would likely intend. 
Thus, even though it is allowing non-debtors to seek remedies under state law 
and not the Code, the Rosenberg court is still furthering the purpose of § 303(i) 
by protecting those potentially suffering serious harm by the very tool that 
Congress created.  
A likely counterargument is the potential “floodgate of litigation” leading to 
an overburdened court system.160 If non-debtors are suddenly permitted to sue 
for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions, the number of potential claimants 
might increase dramatically. Additionally, if in fact the increased 
interconnectivity of modern society has caused non-debtor damage to be both 
more likely and widespread than it was in 1977, this number of potential 
claimants and “flood” of litigation would be even worse. The court in Rosenberg 
acknowledged these “fears of a flood of state court litigation challenging the 
actions of creditors that would chill the use of involuntary bankruptcy 
proceedings and permit state courts to rewrite bankruptcy law.”161 
However, involuntary bankruptcies by definition are initiated by the 
creditor, and there are a variety of reasons why the number of involuntary 
bankruptcy filings remain so low.162 Increasing the potential damages a creditor 
might face is only going to make it less likely that creditors use this tool, thus 
counteracting any additional lawsuits brought by non-debtor third parties. 
 
 158 H.R.Rep. No. 95–595, at 324 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280 (emphasis added); 
S.Rep. No. 95–989, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820 (identical text). 
 159 Stanley Fawcett, Information Sharing and Supply Chain Performance: The Role of Connectivity and 
Willingness, 12 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT.: AN INT’L J. 358, 368 (2007). 
 160 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 489 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
In re Lawrence, 293 F.3d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 2002); Whitbeck v. Cook, 15 Johns. 482, 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
 161 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420. 
 162 Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 844-46 (including reasons such as preference for extrajudicial 
alternatives, informational disadvantages, and the damages provisions in § 303(i)). 
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Finally, under the Rosenberg decision, these lawsuits will be heard in state courts 
throughout the U.S., not burdening the federal bankruptcy courts. 
2. More Consistent with Modern Trends in Bankruptcy Law 
As discussed, throughout the Bankruptcy Code there is tension between the 
competing goals for creditors and debtors. As the focus has continued to shift 
from creditor recovery of debts to debtor relief from the harassment of relentless 
creditors,163 the involuntary bankruptcy provisions should be interpreted this 
way as well. By holding that the Code both preempts state law actions while 
simultaneously not providing standing to third parties, the Miles decision creates 
inconsistency by moving in the other direction.  
The exposure that non-debtor third parties have to the damage caused by bad 
faith involuntary petitions is likely to continue to increase. The Rosenberg 
decision recognized that non-debtors can suffer close to if not just as much harm 
as the debtor.164 The Code provides extensive protection for debtors,165 and the 
Rosenberg court identified that even if the Code does not yet extend to non-
debtors, the courts should recognize this increasing opportunity for harm and not 
foreclose on the opportunity for non-debtors under state law.166 Creditors have 
numerous alternative methods for debt collection both in state courts and by 
encouraging debtors to enter into voluntary bankruptcy.167 If they are going to 
pursue the last resort that is involuntary bankruptcy then they should have to 
consider the risk to non-debtors as well as debtors. 
3. Presumption Against Preemption 
As the Rosenberg court made clear, the presumption against preemption is 
one of two foundational principles required by the Supreme Court in any 
preemption analysis. The only way to overcome this presumption is if Congress’ 
intention is explicitly clear, and ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of 
presumption. 
The courts in both Miles and Rosenberg interpreted the language in § 303(i) 
as ambiguous: 
 
 163 Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 807. 
 164 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420. 
 165 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 166 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420. 
 167 Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 844-46 ( including reasons such as preference for extrajudicial 
alternatives, informational disadvantages, and the damages provisions in § 303(i)). 
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Miles: “The statute is ambiguous as to whether damages under § 303(i) can 
be awarded only in favor of the debtor or in favor of other parties.”168 
Rosenberg: “Starting with text, § 303(i) provides a remedy to the debtor, but 
is silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors harmed by an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition.”169 
The Rosenberg court, however, correctly interpreted ambiguity to mean that 
congressional intent is not clear and manifest.170 Neither the majority nor 
concurrence in Miles followed or even acknowledged the very well established 
presumption against preemption. By finding that non-debtors lack standing 
under § 303(i), entirely excluding the presumption against preemption from their 
analysis, and then finding that the most extreme level of preemption applies, the 
Miles court too quickly and inappropriately concluded that complete preemption 
applied in this case.  
4. Getting Congress’ Attention & Separation of Powers 
By interpreting congressional silence to mean that states have the 
responsibility to assess certain damages related to a bankruptcy proceeding, the 
Third Circuit’s ruling in Rosenberg encourages Congress to clarify its intent. 
This is one of the primary reasons the presumption against preemption exists.171 
If Congress’ intent is to foreclose state law opportunities for non-debtors, the 
Third Circuit’s interpretation in Rosenberg forces Congress to clearly say so. 
This is the appropriate role of the judiciary within the separation of powers 
context as well.172  
C. The Impact of Rosenberg 
The obvious impact of the Rosenberg decision is the amplified risks to 
creditors. As this Comment has shown, the chain reaction of damages resulting 
from dismissed petitions could cast a wide net of potential claimants that is likely 
to continue increasing in the future.173 This increased economic exposure is thus 
likely to result in continued reduction of involuntary bankruptcy petitions. 
Creditors, already exposed to substantial damages in favor of just the debtor, 
will have to be even more careful when electing to use involuntary bankruptcy.  
 
 168 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1093. 
 169 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). 
 172 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216 (2015). 
 173 Fawcett, supra note 159.  
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III. A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION 
In summary, both circuit courts agree that § 303(i) does not provide standing 
to non-debtors to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions. 
The courts split on whether the Code preempts state law action arising from 
these same petitions, with the Ninth Circuit finding for complete preemption and 
the Third finding no preemption. This section introduces a proposed, 
comparatively hybrid interpretation that would read § 303(i) as providing 
standing to non-debtors for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy proceedings 
combined with the application of removal jurisdiction and ordinary preemption. 
This proposal not only follows well-established statutory interpretation 
doctrines, but also allows the courts to achieve the policy goals underlying both 
the Miles and Rosenberg decisions. Similar to the prior analysis, this section 
proceeds in three parts by analyzing this proposal with respect to (1) standing, 
(2) preemption and removal, and (3) effects.  
A. Standing 
The argument that § 303(i) of the Code gives standing to non-debtors rests 
on practical and policy arguments as well as three established textual canons of 
statutory interpretation: (1) the presumption of intention when a statute includes 
a word in one section but not another; (2) the plain meaning canon of 
construction; and (3) the rule against surplusage.  
As previously discussed, the Code permits the courts to grant judgment 
“against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor” under § 303(i)(1)174 and only 
“against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith”175 under § 303(i)(2). 
The language expressly states that § 303(i)(1), awarding attorney’s fees and 
costs, applies to the debtor only, but § 303(i)(2) does not include the express 
language when awarding compensatory and punitive damages when the petition 
is filed in bad faith.176 Unlike the holding in Miles and Rosenberg, policy 
implications and Supreme Court statutory interpretation doctrines demonstrate 
that this discrepancy should be interpreted to be intentional and providing 
standing to non-debtors. This section next examines both the textual and non-
textual arguments in favor of this interpretation. 
 
 174 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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B. Textual Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has clearly ruled on situations where statutes include 
language in one section but not in others: “where Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”177 Because Congress included the debtor 
in § 303(i)(1) but not § 303(i)(2), the courts should presume that Congress did 
so on purpose and that by not expressly limiting damages for bad faith 
involuntary petitions to the debtor, non-debtors should be able to recover under 
this section. Neither the Miles nor Rosenberg courts acknowledge this Supreme 
Court canon. 
Courts often use this presumption of intent with the plain meaning 
construction,178 and this combination of the canons can also be seen within the 
context of the Code. First, even within the same section, § 303(i)(2) includes the 
words “bad faith” while § 303(i)(1) does not.179 However, § 303(i)(2) is clearly 
understood to mean that punitive damages are only available if the court finds 
the petition to be filed in bad faith.180 The court should interpret the single 
inclusion of “debtor” in the same manner.  
Another example of the combination of this presumption of intent and plain 
meaning canon can be found in the interpretation of § 362(c) of the Code.181 
Section 362 governs one of the most important aspects of bankruptcy and the 
Code: the automatic stay.182 The automatic stay prevents creditors from 
beginning or continuing any pursuit against the debtor once the bankruptcy 
petition has begun. Section 362(c) provides for situations in which the automatic 
stay is terminated.183 Section 362(c)(3) governs when a debtor files for 
bankruptcy within one year of a dismissed bankruptcy petition.184 Subsection 
(A) of § 362(c)(A) provides that the automatic stay for actions “taken with 
respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall 
 
 177 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 
722 (5th Cir. 1972)).  
 178 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 179 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016). 
 180 Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1036. 
 181 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
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terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later 
case.”185 However: 
[t]he majority view is that the automatic stay terminates under 
§ 362(c)(3)(A) only with regard to the debtor and property of the 
debtor, not property of the estate.186 Many of these courts have relied 
on the ‘plain language’ of § 362(c)(3)(A) in determining that the 
automatic stay is not terminated in regard to property of the estate after 
the 30–day period expires.187  
Here, the courts have reasoned that by including “property of the estate” in 
other Code provisions, but not in § 362(c)(3)(A), the plain language and 
presumption of Congress’ intent in these situations dictate that the omission was 
intentional.188 A bankruptcy judge has explained this “plain language” approach: 
Section 362(c)(3)(A) as a whole is not free from ambiguity, but the 
words, ‘with respect to the debtor’ in that section are entirely plain; a 
plain reading of those words makes sense and is entirely consistent 
with other provisions of § 362 and other sections of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that the stay terminates ‘with 
respect to the debtor.’ How could that be any clearer?189  
 Thus, bankruptcy courts are not only familiar with using these canons when 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code but have held that they are the appropriate 
manner in which to interpret the Code. A similar method should be used with 
respect to § 303(i) and damages for bad faith involuntary filings. Even if § 303(i) 
“as a whole is not free from ambiguity . . . a plain reading of those words makes 
sense.”190  
Outside of the bankruptcy context, the Supreme Court has been very clear 
about the plain meaning canon of construction, stating that “the meaning of a 
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain…the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms.”191 When the language is plain, “the duty of interpretation 
 
 185 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016); In re Stanford, 373 B.R. 890, 894–95 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007). 
 186 See, e.g., In re Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789 (1st Cir. BAP 2006); In re Tubman, 364 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Md. 
2007); In re McFeeley, 362 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007); In re Hollingsworth, 359 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D. Utah 
2006); In re Pope, 351 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2006); In re Murray, 350 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).  
 187 In re Stanford, 373 B.R. at 895. 
 188 Id. 
 189 In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485. 
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does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no 
discussion.”192  
By simply finding the omission to mean ambiguity, neither of the split courts 
gave proper deference to this Supreme Court doctrine. The meaning of § 303(i) 
can be interpreted plainly and clearly from the statute itself, and thus the courts 
had no “duty of interpretation.” The courts’ inquisitions into the purpose and 
dated legislative history of § 303(i) were unwarranted, and because Congress 
limited § 303(i)(1) to the debtor but did not do so for § 303(i)(2), the courts 
should interpret this to allow non-debtors to have standing. 
The third applicable canon of construction is the rule against surplusage, a 
“basic interpretive canon that a statute should be construed to give effect to all 
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant.”193 While marginally overlapping with the prior two canons, by 
reading § 303(i)(2) as excluding all but the debtor, the Court made Congress’ 
use of “in favor of the debtor” in § 303(i)(1) superfluous.194 This clearly violates 
this basic interpretative canon and the provision should be interpreted as giving 
standing to non-debtor third parties. 
Overall, the few decisions ruling on these situations do not give proper 
deference to Supreme Court textual canons of statutory interpretation. If 
remedied, the courts should find that § 303(i)(2) does give standing to non-
debtors to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions. 
C. Preemption & Removal Jurisdiction 
Once a court finds that the omission of “debtor” in 303(i)(2) means that the 
plain language of the statute can be interpreted to give non-debtors standing, 
those non-debtor plaintiffs will be able to sue under the Code. However, if a 
non-debtor plaintiff instead brings state law claims in state court, the court and 
thus this Comment still must consider both preemption and removal jurisdiction. 
While the Miles court goes too far in applying complete preemption, there are 
legitimate reasons why both removal jurisdiction and ordinary preemption 
should apply in these cases even when considering the strong presumption 
against preemption, especially once non-debtor standing exists under 
§ 303(i)(2).  
 
 192 Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485. 
 193 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 194 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2016). 
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Consequently, with respect to preemption and removal jurisdiction, this 
proposed interpretation supports Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Miles.195 While 
Judge Berzon agreed that § 303 did not grant standing to non-debtors, his 
reasoning for removal and preemption is by far the most in line with precedent 
and practical in its future application.  
For removal jurisdiction purposes, the Ninth Circuit itself previously ruled 
that:  
Proceedings to recover damages under § 303(i) constitute cases under 
title 11 for the purposes of § 1334, both because they depend on 
bankruptcy law for their existence, and because they do not arise 
unless an involuntary bankruptcy petition is dismissed by the 
bankruptcy court.196  
If § 303 does fall within the courts’ original and exclusive jurisdiction, which 
this Comment argues that it does, “[s]tate courts are not authorized to determine 
whether a person’s claim for relief under a federal law, in a federal court, and 
within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is an appropriate one.”197 Even if the 
claim is a state law cause of action, the relief sought still pertains solely to a 
federal involuntary bankruptcy petition. Thus, “it is for Congress and the federal 
courts, not the state courts, to decide what incentives and penalties are 
appropriate for use in connection with the bankruptcy process.”198 The effect of 
this reasoning is similar to that of complete preemption, but its application is 
significantly less complicated and well understood across both federal and state 
courts.199 It is interesting that the Ninth Circuit is one of two courts to explicitly 
rule that § 303(i) proceedings satisfy the requirements for original and exclusive 
jurisdiction and removal to federal court,200 yet still chose to apply complete 
preemption when its own precedent would have achieved essentially the same 
result. No court has declared § 303(i) to fall outside of the § 1334 original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.  
Rosenberg relied on the presumption against preemption because it found 
that the Code is “silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors harmed by an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition.”201 This argument still has merit. However, 
§ 303(i)(2) should be interpreted not as silent, but instead as granting standing 
 
 195 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 196 Johnson, supra note 76. 
 197 Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d at 1036. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Johnson, supra note 76. 
 200 Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1035; Glannon v. Carpenter, 245 B.R. 882, 887 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000). 
 201 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419. 
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to non-debtors. Once non-debtors have standing under the Code, the Code 
provides the exclusive remedy and the presumption against preemption no 
longer applies just as it would not apply to the debtor for the same claim.202  
D. Practical and Policy Implications 
Giving non-debtors standing to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions can further several underlying practical and policy goals in 
both Miles and Rosenberg. There are at least four such rationales: (1) 
constitutional uniformity principles; (2) the purpose of § 303(i); (3) avoiding 
complete preemption doctrine; and (4) encouraging Congress to clarify its intent. 
1. Constitutional Uniformity Principles  
In Miles, the court seemed to reach its conclusion based primarily on 
uniformity concerns:  
[T]he need for uniformity in the administration of the bankruptcy laws 
persuaded the Framers to expressly grant Congress the power ‘to 
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout 
the United States.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Permitting state courts to decide 
whether the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition was 
appropriate would subvert the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts and undermine uniformity in bankruptcy law by allowing state 
courts to create their own standards as to when a creditor may properly 
file an involuntary petition.203  
This is a legitimate line of reasoning. The Rosenberg court casually brushed 
this argument aside by relying on the “traditional comity” between the state and 
federal systems.204 However, it is important to remember that this situation only 
involves bad faith petitions, and as discussed above, the standards for 
determining bad faith with respect to involuntary petitions are themselves 
anything but uniform.205 This interpretation prevents the already “dizzying array 
of standards” from being multiplied across fifty unique state jurisdictions.206 
Furthermore, this potential extrapolation of bad faith standards still does not 
 
 202 Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Congress’ authorization of certain sanctions 
for the filing of frivolous bankruptcy petitions should be read as an implicit rejection of other penalties, including 
the kind of substantial damage awards that might be available in state court tort suits.”). 
 203 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1090. 
 204 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421. 
 205 In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 335. 
 206 Id. 
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even include the wide variety of additional state law actions to be litigated and 
adjudicated once bad faith is determined.  
For example, in Miles the plaintiff asserted claims of defamation, false light, 
abuse of process, emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, and simple 
negligence,207 each of which have their own standards across the fifty states. In 
Rosenberg the plaintiff only filed a “single claim of tortious interference.”208 It 
is unlikely that this difference from Miles was determinative to the final holding, 
but it is a significant difference between the plaintiffs’ assertions in state court. 
This disparity could have influenced the Rosenberg court to give more weight 
to uniformity principles than in Miles.  
Moreover, while it is difficult to have any sympathy for a creditor filing an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition in bad faith, this potentially vast number of bad 
faith standards and unknown types of state law claims makes it extremely 
difficult for creditors to know if their petition will be considered bad faith. 
Congress has committed to keeping involuntary bankruptcy in the Code despite 
its infrequent utilization,209 and such a potentially broad, and increased, 
economic exposure to creditors might curb its use altogether or lead to 
significant forum shopping and other conflict of law issues. Overall, interpreting 
§ 303(i) as allowing non-debtors a path to recovery is likely to accomplish the 
primary goal of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Miles of encouraging “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”210 
2. The Purpose of § 303(i)  
If uniformity is the primary goal of the Miles court, the purpose of § 303(i) 
is likewise the principal policy objective underlying the Third Circuit’s ruling in 
Rosenberg. Similarly, as this hybrid interpretation achieved the uniformity 
goals, it also preserved the remedial purpose of § 303(i). As discussed, § 303(i) 
serves dual purposes. First, debtors and non-debtors are at risk for serious harm 
from unwarranted involuntary bankruptcy filings,211 especially in light of 
increasing interconnectivity and rapid information sharing. Second, allowing the 
court to apply such strict, even punitive, damages serves as a deterrence to 
creditors contemplating the use of a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition as 
a collection tool: 
 
 207 In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1086. 
 208 Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 417. 
 209 Block-Lieb, supra note 15. 
 210 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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The purpose of punitive damages is to deter similar acts in the future, 
both by the petitioning creditors and to serve as an example for others 
in similar circumstances [a] second purpose for punitive damages is to 
punish the petitioning creditors for wrongdoing in filing the petition in 
bad faith.212  
This proposed interpretation furthers both of these objectives. As the court 
argued in Rosenberg, it is unlikely that Congress would affirmatively and 
intentionally foreclose all opportunities for non-debtors in these situations.213 
Combined with the fact that non-debtors are increasingly susceptible to harm in 
modern society, this interpretation serves the remedial purpose of protecting 
those exposed to malicious creditor activity.  
Second, including non-debtors in the scope of creditor liability will only 
further the deterrence scheme underlying the award of compensatory and 
punitive damages under § 303(i). When considering their decision to file, 
creditors must be even more careful to avoid doing so in a manner constituting 
bad faith. An additional advantage is that it will also further protection for 
debtors themselves under § 303(i)(2) if creditors are less likely to file a petition 
in bad faith as a collection tactic. Debtor protection remains one of the most 
important goals of the modern Code and bankruptcy system,214 and it is intuitive 
that the Code would also protect third parties suffering from intentionally 
harmful creditor collection methods.215  
While a more structural or textual analysis, it is important to emphasize the 
way in which Congress’ purpose is evident if non-debtors are given standing 
under § 303(i)(2). Under this interpretation, non-debtors can still only pursue 
damages for bad faith involuntary petitions. While debtors can collect attorney’s 
fees and costs for any dismissed involuntary bankruptcy petition, petitions filed 
by creditors who demonstrate more malevolence than simply being incorrect that 
a debtor is failing to pay its debts. In these situations, it is intuitive that a creditor 
should be liable for all damage proximately caused by the petition. 
3. Avoiding Complete Preemption  
The complete preemption doctrine has only been applied by the Supreme 
Court within the context of three statutes, none of which include the Bankruptcy 
 
 212 In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987). 
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Code.216 The Ninth Circuit in Miles is the first and only circuit to apply the 
doctrine within the bankruptcy context.217 Even if the Miles court correctly 
interpreted § 303(i)(2) to preempt any state law action for non-debtors against 
creditors who file a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition, it unnecessarily 
extended the complete preemption doctrine to this case. 
The confusing complete preemption doctrine can be entirely avoided if the 
courts interpret § 303(i)(2) as granting standing to non-debtors, removal 
jurisdiction is appropriate, and ordinary preemption applies. Because complete 
preemption is so unclear and controversial it has invited academic analyses 
highlighting its inconsistency and the difficulty in expanding to areas beyond 
the specific situations where the Supreme Court has already done so.218 
Unsurprisingly, a variety of concerns have been identified in expanding 
complete preemption without further explanation from the Supreme Court. 
These include chiefly that the doctrine still lacks a clear rule or guideline for 
application outside of the LMRA, ERISA, and NBA contexts.219 The Supreme 
Court’s decisions applying complete preemption lack a “coherent framework of 
principles and rules”220 and the tests are “unworkable” and “capable of 
producing opposite results.”221 Finally, this confusion has led to “only a handful” 
of lower court cases extending the complete preemption doctrine, further 
stymieing its development.222  
When combining the inconsistent doctrine with the uniformity concerns, 
expanding the complete preemption doctrine in the bankruptcy context would 
undermine the uniformity of the bankruptcy system, and removal jurisdiction of 
the statute is more appropriate and less inconsistent: 
Uniformity of the law should and can be instead accomplished by 
removing cases within the original jurisdiction under the general 
removal statute. Such removal does not deprive the states of their 
power to act since only cases already within the federal jurisdiction 
can be removed. Removal of claims within the original jurisdiction of 
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the bankruptcy courts also results in the desired uniformity of the 
bankruptcy law.223  
Finally, in relation to the purpose of § 303(i) and more generally the Code, 
federalism principles require that there be limitations on federal law and 
deference be given to states.224 Because bankruptcy and state law overlap to such 
an extent, when the Code does not expressly provide a solution to a situation the 
courts must defer to state law.225 While this Comment argues that, in this case, 
there is such express statutory support for non-debtor standing, removal to 
bankruptcy court, and preemption of state law claims, it is a risky and potentially 
slippery slope proposition to achieve the result by applying complete preemption 
to the Code. Once a court finds that the Code completely preempts state law in 
the context of § 303, complete preemption might then be easily extended to 
additional Code sections and thus upset the delicate balance between federal and 
state law that exists in the bankruptcy context.  
4. Encourages Congress to Clarify its Intent 
The Supreme Court has stated that the test for the complete preemption 
doctrine is primarily based on congressional intent.226 Like in Rosenberg, this 
interpretation also encourages Congress to clarify its intent without inferring it 
for them but still providing non-debtors a path to a remedy in the meantime. 
Because § 303 would now provide standing for non-debtors, if Congress did in 
fact want to bar them from an avenue towards recovery, it would be forced to do 
so expressly. This again prevents courts from legislating as a judiciary. 
E. Impact of Proposed Interpretation 
The impact of this proposed interpretation would be similar to the impact 
from Rosenberg, with an increasing number of non-debtor claims and a 
corresponding further decrease in involuntary bankruptcy petitions. However, 
and distinct from the impact of the Rosenberg decision, limiting the claims to 
federal court and § 303 should lead to a more efficient and expedient 
development of standards and predictable results around which parties can 
negotiate outside of the court system, a result likely favored by all parties 
involved.227 Furthermore, because so few courts have had to address these issues 
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of fact and law,228 there is little chance of a gate behind which a flood of non-
debtors are waiting for § 303 standing before bringing their claim.229  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this nuanced and sparsely litigated area of law warrants 
further analysis by both Congress and the courts. As long as Congress continues 
its support of the involuntary bankruptcy process, despite its decline in use, those 
harmed by its abuse deserve a clear answer to their options for recovery.  
This issue is one of continually competing principles and objectives: creditor 
versus debtor bankruptcy goals; federal versus state federalism interests of both 
law and forum; textual versus intent statutory interpretative methods; and 
constitutional uniformity versus the remedial purpose of bankruptcy law. While 
the Ninth Circuit in Miles favored federal law and constitutional uniformity in 
bankruptcy law, the Third Circuit in Rosenberg deferred to state law and the 
remedial purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. If forced to choose, the author would 
rather sacrifice uniformity before foreclosing non-debtors “remov[ing] all 
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”230 As such, the 
recent Third Circuit decision creating the circuit split is preferable. 
Lastly, a hybrid approach would instead confer Code standing to non-debtor 
third parties harmed by bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions, while 
reaffirming established preemption removal jurisdiction doctrines. This 
interpretation offers a path that reconciles bankruptcy uniformity and purpose 
principles while protecting those taking collateral damage.  
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